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attract. And indeed there can be no question about
Lucretius' skillfulness in "boney-coating" the medicine
of the pbilosopby of materialism. 1 His use of exempla
drawn from the natural world continues even today to
delight, to instruct, and to seduce his readers into an
understanding of difficult theories. For instance, the
verbal image of fleecy sheep grazing on a far-off
billside (2.317-322) makes readily comprebensible the
concept of the invisibility of the individual moving
atom. In his use of such exempla from the natural world,
Lucretius is, of course, doing more than simply making
palatable the principles ofEpicurean physics by offering
familiar situations as proofs for the scientific arguments;
be is also implicitly instructing bis readers in the
methodology of Epicurean logic by encouraging them,
first, to accept the validity of sense perception as the
basis for exploring our universe and, second, to abstract
from the perceived world to the unperceived world. In
tbe didacticism of Lucretius, philosophic and poetic
purposes converge, and the union is so seamless that
we cannot justly evaluate tbe originality of bis
contributions to tbe pbilosophic tradition witbout
analyzing the literary aspects of the poem. Lucretius'
presentation ofEpicurean ethics is especially dependent
on a complex interweaving of poetic elements, such as
recurring images, metapbors and verbal motifs. Of
particular interest to philosophers tracing the bistory of
buman thought about our relationsbips with other

Modem philosophers interested in the moral status of
animals frequently debate the possibility of extending
justice to animals througb a theory of social contract,
witb Rawl's theory usually providing the basis of
discussion. Contractualism was, of course, also an
interest of ancient pbilosopbers, particularly tbe
Epicureans, wbo believed that "pleasure," dermed as
"freedom from anxiety," was the summum bonum and
that this "pleasure" was dependent, in part, on human
willingness to form contracts with one another. In this
paper, I will propose that the Roman poet/pbilosopber
Lucretius develops an ethical theory that "pleasure" is
also achieved by forming contracts with some nonbuman species and by physically separating ourselves
from other species. I will then examine a passage in the
De Rerum Natura where Lucretius demonstrates that
bumans cause anxiety and distress for themselves wben
they violate these arrangements.
Lucretius is often dismissed by philosopbers as
simply the didactic poet whose contributions to the
western pbilosophic tradition lie not in any originality
of thought, but rather in his ability to make the teacbings
of the Garden accessible to a wider audience than the
cballenging Greek texts of the master Epicurus migbt
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species are the many descriptions of animals. Although
at first glance these passages may appear to be
"honey-coating," that is, literary embellishments to
the philosophical arguments, or even digressions
interrupting the philosophical arguments, in fact they
serve to enrich and expand our comprehension of
Lucretius' fundamental ethical thesis: that true
happiness can be achieved only by freeing oneself from
mental disturbance.
In Book 5 of De Rerum Natura, Lucretius discusses
the creation of our world from the eternal movement of
indestructible atoms. In the final third of this book
(5.925-1457), he concentrates his attention on the
development of human society and culture, and here
we find his most extended account of humankind's
changing interactions with other animals. At 5.925 ff.,
Lucretius informs us that the earliest humans were tough
and solitary individuals who "lived out their lives in
the manner of roving wild animals" (5.932). They used
neither fire nor clothing, they were satisfied with food
gained by hunting and foraging, and they were content
with bushes and caves for shelter. "When night overtook
them, they placed their rough, naked limbs on the
ground, like bristly wild pigs, wrapping themselves up
in leaves and branches" (5.969-971). Primeval humans
were both hunters and hunted, sometimes, by their
deaths, providing food for other species (5.990-991).
These beast-like humans obviously lacked the
material comforts and physical protections of civilized
society, but they also lacked its anxieties. Throughout
the poem, Lucretius expresses concern that people of
his own period were tortured by situations of their own
making, such as war, where we manufacture death for
our own species. Primitive humans endured no such
self-created afflictions. They lived isolated from one
another and did not engage in activities where "many
thousands of men, following military banners, are led
to death in a single day" (5.999-1000). Primitive man's
worries were restricted to injury and death caused by
natural forces, in particular an attack from another
species. Primeval existence was not, of course, a Golden
Age of tranquillity. Attacks by boars and lions caused
agonizing deaths for humans: "Tom by the animal's
teeth, he would fill the mountains and forests with his
shrieks as he watched his own living flesh buried in a
living tomb" (5.991-993). Lucretius presents a
description of human life at its most bestial stage in
order to establish a point of contrast, first, with the
technologically advanced, but anxiety-ridden life of his
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own period, and, second, with the tranquil existence
which humans enjoy if they understand the nature of
their relationships to other species.
A little earlier in Book 5, at 855 ff., in his discussion
of the origins of animal life, Lucretius states that the
species still existing at his time were those which had
adapted well to their situations. Wild species survive
because they are endowed with particular qualities
which provide them with protection; for example, they
are savage, like lions, cunning, like foxes, or swift, like
deer (5.862-863).2 Other species, perhaps less wellendowed, such as sheep, cattle, horses, and dogs, sought
the protection of humans, and, in a mutually beneficial
arrangement, they provide us with meat, dairy products,
wool or labor in return for readily-available food and
safety from predators. In his account of this process,
Lucretius has stated a theory recently iterated by
Stephen Budiansky: that domestication is a natural
occurrence and that some species choose to move in
and cooperate with one another. 3 As Lucretius describes
the process, humans did not forcibly create barnyards;
rather, certain species entrusted themselves to our
custody or guardianship (tutela, 5.861 and 867)4 and we
accepted the responsibility because of their usefulness
to us (utilitas, 5.860,870, 873).5 These domestic species
have formed with us what Desmond Morris calls "the
animal contract," a tacit understanding that cooperation
between the species would be mutually expedient. 6 For
each species, the contract offered securitas, "freedom
from anxiety," and thus Epicurean "pleasure."7 The
contract permitted the development of agriculture which,
in turn, moved humankind from a brutish existence to
the prosperity and safety of a human community. The
progress of our civilization has therefore depended on
the willingness of other species to choose domestication
and to enter into alliances with us. The benefits to
humankind are enormous, but the benefits to the other
species are dependent on human willingness to fulfill
our part of the "animal contract," our tacit agreement
to provide security for them even as they offer us the
security of a stable food supply. Our promise of security
is not a promise of a long life, but of a "secure,"
anxiety-free life. At 2.875-880, Lucretius describes the
"food chain." Lush pastures are transformed into cattle,
which we eat and thus transform into human bodies,
which, in turn, sometimes provide food for wild animals
or scavenging birds. Lucretius accepts the use of herd
animals for human food as a natural pattern, but
nonetheless believes that we owe them, as well as
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to swap goods and services: food and protection from
predators in exchange for meat, milk, wool, and labor,
tutela for utilitas. Humans are portrayed as the stronger
party in the agreement because they can serve as
protectors, but quite clearly they assume that an
agreement exists, that it involves a swap, and that they
can expect a return for their efforts. The basis of the
agreement for both parties is the anticipation ofbenefits.
Thus, if Lucretius is stating, as I think he is, that certain
species did in fact fmm tacit contracts with humans
and that these contracts were motivated by a desire for
security on each side, then any violation of the contract
and failure on the human side to provide security would
constitute unjust treatment.
For Lucretius, the utility of animals to humans lies
in their participation in a broad range of activities which
assure a regular and ample food supply. And, although
the dogs and horses may sometimes have assisted in
hunting expeditions, for the most part, these activities
fall under the category of agriculture. Lucretius does
not provide a relative chronology for the origins of
human covenants with other humans and with other
animals, both of which led to stable and prosperous
agricultural communities, but presumably he believed
that the developments were parallel occurrences, each
affecting the success of the other. Moreover, he surely
considered these developments to be positive because
a dependable food supply would foster the desired peace
of mind, the Epicurean "pleasure."14 Indeed, the
emphasis in Lucretius' description of the discovery of
plant cultivation (5.1361-78) is on the pleasure produced
by the mere sight of carefully ordered croplands and
orchards, a sight which bears witness to humankind's
empirically developed ability to make plants produce
food in abundance. In this description of humankind's
successes as a cultivator, it is Lucretius' poetic devices,
particularly his choice and placement of words, which
impart the ethical message that there is pleasure and
therefore "good" in encouraging fruitfulness. The
farmland is "delightful" (dulcis, 1367), the grain fields
and vineyards are "luxuriant" (laeta, 1372) and the
orchards are "fruitful" (jelicibus, 1378).
Here we are reminded of the opening of the poem,
the invocation to Venus, who is an allegory both for the
fertility of creative nature and for the pleasure which
this fertility brings: "0 nurturing Venus, pleasure of
men and gods" (hominum divumque voluptas/alma
Venus, 1.1 and 2). The advent of Venus brings light and
life, fragrant flowers, green meadows and "luxuriant

working dogs and horses, security from hunger, thirst
and predators. In exchange for their products and
services, we have agreed to free them from fear.
The relevance of 5.855-877 to Epicurean theories
ofjustice is significant. Epicurus taught thatjustice was
an agreement among humans not to harm or be harmed. s
He did not consider it a natural element of the human
character or a transcendent norm, but rather a prudent
invention to provide that security, or freedom from
disturbance, which constituted true pleasure and which
was impossible when human beings preyed on one
another. Justice was thus rigidly subordinated to
demands of personal security and would have no
existence if security could be acquired without it.
Epicurus believed that animals (and some humans) were
incapable of making agreements not to harm or be
harmed and therefore of being included under
definitions ofjustice or injustice.9 Epicurus' successor,
Hermarchus, elaborated on this aspect of Epicurus'
theory of justice by remarking that it would have been
advantageous for humans to extend justice to other
animals by participating in contracts with them in order
to increase our own security, but such contracts were
impossible because animals do not possess reason. 10
Yet despite the apparent denial of "animal contracts"
by Epicurus and Hermarchus, in 5.860 ff. of Lucretius'
poem, we read about a pattern of contract formation
between humans and animals which resembles the
human-human contracts described by Epicurus, and by
Lucretius at 5.1019-1020, in the sense that the impulse
for cooperation was a calculation of expediency. The
sheep, cattle, horses, and dogs of 5.860 ff. empirically
determined that existence within a human society was
more secure than existence without, even as the humans
of 5.1011 ff. empirically determined, first, that family
life and, then, that community life defined by a mutual
covenant of non-aggression 11 provided a better chance
for survival of both the individual and the species than
the isolated existence of the earliest humanS. 12 There
are, of course, important differences between the
human-human and human-animal contracts described
by Lucretius. The human-human covenants of 5.10191020, which laid the foundation for social life, were
mutual non-aggression pacts among men of similar
capabilities not to harm one another or the weaker
members of the community. If the lions and boars of
5.862 and 985 had formed covenants with humans, the
terms would have been similar. 13 The human-animal
contracts of 5.864-870, however, were tacit agreements
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pastures" (pabula laeta, 1.15) in which domesticated
herds frolic. Lucretius urges Venus to lull to rest Mars,
an allegory of war, destruction and death. IS Thus, at
the very beginning of his poem, Lucretius establishes a
dichotomy: creation/pleasure vs. destruction/anxiety. 16
Poetic images instruct us that the human cultivation of
plants and husbandry of animals is a participation in
the creative processes ofnature (natura creatrix, 5.1362)
and a source of true pleasure. Lucretius repeats several
times in the poem the joyful image of pastures and
domesticated flocks which appears first in the
invocation to Venus. At 1.257-261, for example, he
describes herd animals, with their udders full of milk,
resting in "luxuriant pastures" (pabula laeta, 257), while
their young offspring play in the tender grass. The poetry
seduces the reader by evoking recall of a situation which
is pleasurable: the sight of secure and fertile domestic
animals. The logical function of this passage is to
explicate a principle of Epicurean physics: that nothing
is ever reduced to nothing, but rather every compound
eventually dissolves into atoms from which new
compounds are created. 17 Yet this passage also
reinforces an element ofEpicurean ethics by developing
the poetic motif that domestication is a source of
pleasure for humans. A similar duality of didactic
purpose occurs at 2.317-322, a passage mentioned
earlier in this paper. Here Lucretius uses an exemplum
of sheep in "luxuriant pastures" (pabula laeta, 317) with
their well-fed lambs to elucidate his comments about
the invisibility of the movement of atoms, but again
the poetic imagery underlines also the ethical point that
domestication brings pleasure. Such images remind us
that agriculture offers the security of a dependable food
supply and thus the pleasure of a secure mind. In
contrast, the pre-agricultural humans described in 5.925
ff., although free of self-imposed anxieties such as war
and religion, were disturbed by concerns about the
uncertainty of their food supply and about the dangers
inherent in obtaining food.
If we were to locate a Golden Age in Lucretius'
narrative of human history, it would be a period when
the development of communities provided a security
unknown to primitive individuals, but where human
inventiveness had not yet turned its attention to the
manufacture of artificial terrors. Humankind's best
opportunity for peace of mind is therefore an ideal
agricultural community, an Epicurean Garden perhaps,
where the regular and orderly rhythms of plant
cultivation and animal husbandry protect inhabitants
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from anxiety about physical necessities. In this Garden,
security is maintained by cooperative efforts to repel
''non-contract'' animals, like lions, boars, foxes and deer,
which devour human food (or humans!) without
offering compensation, while "contract" animals fulfIll
their obligations to provide labor, food and wool. I8
However Lucretius suggests that humans have at times
failed to fulfill their part of the contract and he correlates
human violations of the contract with our incorrect
judgments about the sources of pleasure and happiness.
Within his general outline of the development of
human society in Book 5, Lucretius notes that man's
earliest weapons were his own hands and teeth (man at
his most beast-like), then tools such as stones and
branches, and finally metal implements (5.1283-1286).
He then reminds us, at 5.1289-1292, that copper and
iron could be utilized for both agriculture and war. 19
"With copper they worked the soil; with copper they
stirred the billowing waves of war, and scattered
devastating wounds. And they seized herds and fields.
Everything else, naked and unarmed, readily fell prey
to them, since they were armed." Here Lucretius uses
metaphors to press his points. The Latin verb serere,
translated by "scattered," denotes the process of sowing,
as in sowing a field with seeds. In Lucretius, however,
warriors sow wounds. In their actions, they are like
farmers, but, in their results, quite the opposite: farmers
scatter life, warriors scatter death. The contrast between
agriculture and war continues: farmers protect herds
and fields, warriors destroy them. And, with the
technology for metal weapons, the armed warrior easily
dominates all the unarmed creatures whose way of life
his cave-dwelling ancestors once shared.
For Lucretius, the invention of metal-working was
a mixed blessing, allowing advancement in the life-giving
activities of agriculture, but also producing new ways of
death. The topic of non-animate implements of war
leads him to the topic of animate implements and, at
5.1297, he begins a discussion about the employment
of animals for warfare, claiming that the frrst animals
which people took to the battlefield were horses, used
as mounts for warriors and, later, as draught animals to
pull chariots. Lucretius then notes, at 5.1302-1304, that
the Carthaginians successfully "trained elephants to
endure the agonies of war." Since that time, he observes,
humankind's "woeful inability to cooperate has given
birth to one invention after another" which terrifies
human warriors and adds to the horrors of war, day in
and day out. For example, Lucretius writes at 5.1308
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ff., people tried to use bulls, boars and lions as animate

why war must be avoided. His poetic imagery instructs
us as forcefully as any prose treatise on ethics could
that human military ambitions destroy the orderly and
peaceful rhytbms of tbe Garden, and simply return
humans to the cave, to that level of primitivism from
which, in other respects and with other inventions, they
had advanced. It is particularly significant that Lucretius
chose to depict not just humans in conflict with one
another, but several species brought into indiscriminate
combatbecause ofhuman failure to comprehend the basis
of true pleasure. Once again,references to human interactions with other species illuminate a central ethical thesis.
The adjective "savage" (saevus) is used three times
in 5.1309-1314, once of the boars (sues saevos, 1309),
once of the lions (leones saevi, 1310-1314), and once
of the humans (saevis magistris, "savage handlers,"
1311). The repetition of the adjective draws togetber
boars, lions, and humans as agents in a portrait of
frenzied slaughter.21 The humans are also called "armed
trainers" (doctoribus armatis) in 1311. The juxtaposition of the nouns magistri and doctores with the
adjectives saevi and armati is jarring. The nouns
magistri and doctores denote people who have acquired
knowledge and have mastered skills, people who could
use their knowledge and skills to lead others away from
violence and warfare and toward increased security and
pleasure. 22 The greatest of teachers, Epicurus,
developed a philosophy whose "delightful solaces
soothed (permulcent) human minds" (5.21). But the
teachers of5.1311 are "savage" and "armed," and spend
their efforts on experiments which only intensify human
anxieties. The movement away from tbe Garden is
clearly defmed in this section of the poem. The "armed"
trainers were unable to control tbe movements of tbe
bulls, boars and lions, and tbe horsemen were unable
to soothe (mulcere, 5.1317) the terrified spirits of the
horses. This passage impresses upon us tbe insanity of
forcing animals into situations unnatural to them. Our
earliest war animals, tbe horses mentioned at 5.1297
ff., had a contract with us: labor in return for food and
protection from savage animals. Yet we violated the
contract and put them on a battlefield with tbese same
savage animals. Having ourselves regressed to savagery,
we erased the boundaries between contract and
non-contract animals which had permitted the
expansion ofpeaceful and creative activities. The horses
had entrusted themselves to our care because they
wanted peace (5.868-869: pacem secuta sunt). They
were willing to labor for us in exchange for security,

implements of war. The experiments were unsuccessful
because tbese animals could not be trained to be steady,
obedient companions. Panic-stricken by tbe carnage of
battle, tbe lions leapt at friend and foe alike, tbe bulls
trampled tbeir trainers and tbe boars gored tbem witb
tbeir tusks. The result of tbese experiments was utter
chaos, as tbe animals attacked one anotber, screamed
in pain and ran in frenzied disorder on tbe battlefield. It
is important to notice tbat, in 5.1308-1310, Lucretius
traces tbe development of empirically determined
concepts by depicting a series of experiments which
led up to tbe disastrous battle, experiments which
progressed from using contract animals as mounts, to
using contract animals as offensive weapons, and tben
to using non-contract animals as offensive weapons:
"Mter tbeir success witb horses and elephants, men tried
(temptarunt) bulls in battle; and tbey tried (experti sunt)
to send boars against tbe enemy; and some sent lions in
the front rank."20
The animals-in-warfare passage functions, however,
as more tban a narrative element in the history ofhuman
progress. It also serves in tbe development of Lucretius'
theme that humans are responsible for much of tbeir
own anxiety and, more particularly, tbat they themselves
suffer when tbey violate tbe human-animal contract,
abuse animals and ignore tbe patterns of nature. Witb
tbe invention of metal implements which enabled
humans to overpower everytbing that was naked and
unarmed (5.1292), two courses of action were now
possible: 1. creation of a Garden where several species
interacted peacefully and metal was used botb for
implements like ploughs pulled by contract animals,
and also for weapons to protect tbe Garden from noncontract animals, and 2. utilization of metal weapons
to seize the herds and fields of others, thus inviting
retaliatory violence and initiating an "arms race" in which
ultimately botb contract and non-contract animals were
employed as machines of war. The former course
promotes creation and tberefore pleasure; the latter
invites destruction and tberefore anxiety. Lucretius does
not, however, explicitly recommend that we make a
choice between antitbetical options; instead he guides
us to the correct decision by expanding his presentation
of tbe horrible consequences of devoting human
inventiveness to metbods of destruction. The terrifying
description oftbe battle scene in which several species,
including humans, are killing and being killed in a
hideous manner is Lucretius' culminating statement of
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but we used their labor in warfare, where they were
forced to endure pain, where their flanks and bellies
were gored (5.1324). The bulls, another domesticated
species and therefore "under contraet," were also forced
into a situation where they became panic-stricken, and
trampled their handlers underfoot and gored the horses.
Even the animals which the human handlers had
considered to be sufficiently trained at home became
frenzied by the tumult, noise and pain of battle. Thus
humankind. whose progress from primitivism could be
marked by its ability to ease the fears of animals and
then train them for agricultural use, became a "wilder"
of beasts, forcing them back into situations from which
their wild ancestors had originally sought the protection
of humans. Clearly, the breach of contract, which the
abuse of domestic animals implies, causes horrifying
chaos and a clear regression from people's productive
coexistence with other animals in the Garden.
And what of the boars and lions? They had long
threatened human life, and humankind had formed no
contracts with them. Indeed people had deliberately kept
their distance, avoiding the areas in which those animals
lived and gathering into their Garden only those species
with which they could form contracts. And yet. in order
to enhance their military capabilities, people were
willing to experiment with an unnatural alliance and to
attempt to train randomly savage animals to be savage
on command. The boars and lions, of course, would
have no part of such an alliance. On the battlefield, they
acted true to nature, attacking other species and the
people who had brought them there. Thus humankind,
by its arrogant and insane refusal to observe the patterns
of nature, had ironically engineered its own destruction
by those very same animals whose unexpected attacks
humankind's earliest ancestors had tried to avoid.
To sum up: through poetic imagery and thematic
patterns, rather than through argument, Lucretius
demonstrates that security-the Epicurean "pleasure"is best achieved by forming mutually-beneficial
contracts with some species and by separating ourselves
from other species. He also suggests that the abuse of
animals in warfare indicates human ignorance or
contempt for the patterns of nature and that, although
motivated by our desire for security/pleasure, such
abuse only increases human distress.

2 At 3.741-743, Lucretius uses these same species to
illustrate the inheritance of qualities such as ferocity, cunning,
and swiftness.
3 Stephen Budiansky, The Covenant ofthe Wild (New York
1992). Budiansky argues for the co-evolution of humankind
and other species, for example, at p. 165: "The domestic
alliance is an evolutionary strategy of adaptive significance; ... anima1s chose us because we were a better deal in
an evolutionary sense than life in the wild."
4 The Latin noun tutela, used by Lucretius only here in
the poem (5.861 and 867), is cognate with the verb tuJor ("to
keep safe") and the adjective tuJus ("safe"). Tutela means
"defense," "maintenance" or "care." All three defmitions are
applicable in this context. In legal terminology, tutela means
a formal power of guardianship over the affairs of someone
who is unable to protect himlherself because of age or mental
incapacity. In contrast to the animals who place themselves
under our tutela, wild animals depend on their innate qualities
to keep them safe.

5 The Latin noun utiiitas can be defined as "utility,"
"profit," or "advantage."
6 Desmond Morris, The Animal Contract: Sharing the
Planet (London 1990).

7 The Latin noun securitas and adjective securus are
formed from se = "without" and cura ="anxiety."
8 Epicurus, Principle Doctrines, 6, 31, 33. Richard Sorabji,
Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993) 162,
uses the translation ''to avoid causing or suffering harm" for
the terms of the contract. Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus' Ethical
Theory (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989) 79-92, distinguishes Epicurus'
contractual theories from those of Locke or Rousseau, noting
that Epicurus makes self-interest/pleasure a prior standard by
which contracts themselves are justified.
9 Epicurus, Principle Doctrines, 32. A precise translation
of the Greek would be "as many of the living creatures as
were not able"-which seems to leave open the question
whether Epicurus believed that there were some species
which could make agreements. See A.A. Long and D.N.
Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987), vol.
1, 135 and vol. 2, 129.
10 Hermarchus, in Porphyrius, On Abstinencefrom Animal
Food 1.12.5 and 6. Hermarchus, 1.10 and 11, believed that
all species could be detrimental to human well-being: wild
animals (such as lions and wolves) because they might attack
and injure us and domestic animals (such as sheep and cattle)
because they might, if allowed to overpopulate, consume food
which we need. He therefore approved of killing all members
of savage species and those members of domestic species
which were excess, that is, not being used to human benefit.

Notes
1 Lucretius' comparison of himself to a doctor honeycoating a cup of bitter wormwood occurs at 1.936-950.
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17 1.263-264: "Nature fashions one object from another
object and allows nothing to be born except with the assistance
of the death of something else." Epicurus taught that
destruction (death) was as natural a process as creation, and
that the continual presence of each process served to maintain
a balance in the universe. Lucretius describes the
life-<leath-life cycle at 2.576-580: "blended with the funeral
lament is the wail which infants raise when they first see the
light of life. Never has any night following day or any dawn
following night not heard the mournful laments of death
mingled with a newborn's cries." Yet, although Lucretius
might declare with scientific insistence that death was not to
be feared, his poetic celebration oflife as pleasurable clearly
indicates that his sympathies lie with creation.

Paul Vander Waerdt, "Hermarchus and the Epicurean
Genealogy of Morals," TAPA 118 (1988) 87-106, discusses
Hermarchus' opposition to Empedocles' and Theophrastus'
belief that it is unjust to kill animals because a kinship exists
between us and them.
11 The "covenant" is defined in 5.1019 by the Latin noun
amicities, which means "friendship" or "friendly alliance."
For a discussion of Epicurean concepts of friendship and their
relevance to Lucretius' history of human political systems,
see J. M. Rist, "Epicurus on Friendship," Classical Philology
75 (1980), 121-129; also Mitsis, 98-128.

12 The terms of the amicities ensure the security not only
of the contractors, but also of their weaker dependents, their
children and wives (5.1021-1023). The "animal contract" of
860 ff. does not explicitly specify protection of offspring,
perhaps because even the adult animals are defined as
dependents or "wards" of the humans (see footnote 4). By
seeking a dependent relationship with humans, these species
ensure the protection of their offspring and therefore the
survival of their species, as opposed to those species
mentioned by Lucretius at 5.871-877 which became extinct
because the were endowed with no natural asset which would
enable them either to live in the wild, or to offer an utilitas
which might persuade us to feed them and keep them safe
(tutum, 5.874). In arguing his case for co-evolution,
Budiansky, 125 notes that the species which chose
domestication have been remarkably successful at survival.
"In 1860, man and domestic species accounted for 5 percent
of terrestrial biomass. Today the figure is approximately 20
percent." (An animal protectionist might question whether
we can use the term "successful" of species which live brief
lives in factory conditions.)

18 At 5.39-42, Lucretius asserts that wild animals, which
had posed a major threat to primitive human existence, could
in his day be easily avoided because they lived in inaccessible
areas. His statement implies that he considered the boundaries
between cultivated and uncultivated, domestic and wild, to
be easily discernible. (See, however, footnote 13.)
19 James Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, 168
ff., remarks that this passage underlines the troubling, yet
necessary interconnections between progress in the arts and
in warfare. Lucretius realized that human curiosity and desire
for prosperity were responsible for inventions which promoted
peace of mind (the philosophy of Epicurus being the greatest
of these inventions), but that curiosity and desire also produced
developments in destructive technology. Cf. 5.1430-1435,
where Lucretius laments that humans fail to recognize that
there must be a limit to acquisition. Mitsis, 91, remarks that
Epicurean philosophy offers "compelling hedonistic reasons"
for controlling our desires rationally.
20 Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984)
58, comments on the animals-in-warfare passage that each
discovery, from mounted horses to chariot horses to war
elephants and then to bulls, lions, and boars, can be viewed as
growing out ofa previous one "by the application ofempirically
formed concepts. As in all other crafts, the adaptation of a
concept to a new situation results in new observations, which
may then inspire further experimentation."

13 The fox and deer of 5.863 are in a different category.
The threat they pose to humankind is not of aggression but of
devouring our food supplies. The deer, moreover, are useful
to us as food. Neither Lucretius nor Hermarchus provides an
explicit distinction between predator and prey (wild animals)
and between edible and inedible (domestic animals).
14

5.958-961: The food supply of primitive humans was
uncertain and they were not able to give consideration to the
common good. Each individual carried off for himself
whatever prize fortune brought him.

21 De Grummond, "On the Interpretation of De Rerum
Natura Y.1308-1349," Atene e Roma 26-27 (1981-82) 52,
notes that saevus is a standing epithet for lions and boars in
Lucretius, but is used directly of humans only here in the
poem. He also notes that 9 of the 15 occurrences of saevus
are in Book 5.

15 The activities of Mars also preclude the tranquillity
necessary for the creative work of philosophy in which
Lucretius was engaged (1. 41 and 42).

16 Charles Segal, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety
(Princeton 1990) 208 ff., discusses the dialectic in Lucretius'
poem between creation/destruction, life/death, peace/war,
serenitylrestlessness, and philosophy/superstition. See also c.R.
Beye, "Lucretius and Progress," Classical Journal 58 (1963).
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22 The noun doctor is cognate with the verb docere, "to
teach," "to train." Lucretius frequently uses the verb to
describe his own activity of explicating Epicurean philosophy
in Latin verse, i.e. 1.265,3.31,5.56. The noun magister often
means "teacher."
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